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COMPARING SCHOOL CHOICE AND COLLEGE ADMISSION
MECHANISMS BY THEIR IMMUNITY TO STRATEGIC ADMISSIONS
SOMOUAOGA BONKOUNGOU AND ALEXANDER NESTEROV
Abstract. Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the
world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the
policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the
system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost
none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the
reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a
smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipu-
late. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of
students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that
the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) is incomplete.
Keywords : matching market design, school choice, college admission, manipulability
JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78, D82
1. Introduction
In recent years, dozens of school districts around the world have reformed their school ad-
missions systems. Examples include education policy reforms for K-9 Boston Public Schools
(BPS) in 2005, Chicago Selective High Schools (SHS) in 2009 and 2010, Denver Public
Schools in 2012, Seattle Public Schools in 1999, Ghanaian Secondary Public Schools in 2007
and Primary Public Schools in more than 50 cities and provinces in England and Wales in
2005-2011. Like school admissions, many college admissions systems have also been reformed;
well-known examples include college admissions in China and Taiwan.
Sometimes the reforms were a pressing issue. The Chicago SHS, for example, called for a
reform in a midstream of their admissions process. What were the policymakers concerned
about, and what was it at stake for such a sudden midstream change? There are signs indi-
cating that the public and the policymakers were concerned about the high vulnerability of
Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg
E-mail addresses: bkgsom@gmail.com, nesterovu@gmail.com.
Date: January 16, 2019.
We thank Parag Pathak and Tayfun So¨nmez for their comments and continuous communication. We also
thank Anna Bogomolnaia, Herve Moulin, Lars Ehlers, Sean Horan, Onur Kesten, Rustamdjan Hakimov,
Szilvia Papai, Yan Chen, Fuhito Kojima, Alvin Roth, Fedor Sandomirskiy and Mikhail Panov for their
feedback. Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of
Economics is gratefully acknowledged. The research is partially financed by the RFBR grant 20-01-00687.
IMMUNITY TO STRATEGIC ADMISSIONS 2
the admissions mechanisms to strategic manipulations. For example, the former superinten-
dent of the Boston BPS said that their mechanism “should be replaced with an alternative
[...] that removes the incentives to game the system” (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008).
Indeed, this high vulnerability made strategy an essential decision for students and led
to serious mismatches between schools and students. Strategic rankings were playing an
unbalanced role in admissions versus priorities/grades, and that was perceived undesir-
able. For example, the education secretary in England remarked that their admissions
system were forcing “many parents to play an admissions game with their children’s future”
(Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). Prior to the reform in China, “a good score in the college en-
trance exam is worth less than a good strategy in the ranking of colleges” (Chen and Kesten,
2017; Nie, 2007).
These issues also compromise the perceived fairness of the system as the consequences to
truthful students can be disastrous. The Chicago SHS called for reform after they observed
that “High-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of the order in which they listed
their college prep preferences” (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). As one parent in China reports:
“My child has been among the best students in his school and school district. [...] Unfortu-
nately, he was not accepted by his first choice. After his first choice rejected him, his second
and third choices were already full. My child had no choice but to repeat his senior year.”
(Chen and Kesten, 2017; Nie, 2007). Reportedly, similar concerns resulted in protests in
Taiwan (Dur et al., 2018).
Did the reforms make the admissions mechanisms fully immune to manipulation? The
answer is no. Except for Boston, each reform replaced one vulnerable mechanism with
another vulnerable mechanism. This is a puzzle, given what motivated these reforms. But
could it be that the new mechanisms are more immune to manipulations than the old ones?
Did the reforms weakened the incentives to manipulate and made the consequences thereof
less harmful to others? To address this question we develop a criterion to rank mechanisms
by their level of what we call immunity to strategic admissions.
To explain this criterion, let us begin with the most immune mechanisms. A mechanism
is strategy-proof when no student can ever gain from manipulating his preferences. That is,
for such a mechanism the admission of each student i to each school s is strategy-proof. Let
us generalize this definition to any, possibly not strategy-proof, mechanism. We say that
the admission to school s is strategy-proof to student i via mechanism A if none
of i’s profitable manipulations gives him an admission at school s. In other words, all the
misreports that result in student i’s admission to school s via mechanism A are not profitable:
in each of those instances, he is weakly better-off reporting his preferences truthfully. This
student has no reason to misreport his preferences to mechanism A when aiming at school
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# School Name US rank min score max score
1 Payton 9 898 900
2 Northside 23 894 900
3 Lane 69 873 900
4 Young 71 883 900
5 Jones 91 891 900
6 Brooks 186 799 890
7 Lindblom 272 772 858
8 Westinghouse 574 773 884
9 King 1,133 678 844
10 South Shore 6,066 684 820
Table 1. Chicago selective high schools (SHS): rankings and cutoff grades.
Notes : South Shore was added to SHS in 2011, followed by Hancock school in 2015. The US rank is
according to US News & World 2019 Report; the grades are reported for general admission in 2019, the
maximal feasible grade is 900; the data source is www.go.cps.edu.
s. Student i may still profitably manipulate mechanism A and get an admission at other
schools — but not at s.
We measure the level of immunity of a mechanism by how strategy-proof admission to
each school is. Formally, mechanism A ismore immune (to strategic admissions) than
B if for each student i the set of schools whose admission is strategy-proof to i via B is a
subset of the set of schools whose admission is strategy-proof to i via A, while the converse
is not true. Thus, with a more immune mechanism, each student faces more schools that he
cannot be admitted to via a profitable strategy.
We find that each reform made the mechanisms more immune. For each student we com-
pare by inclusion the two sets — before and after the reforms — of schools whose admission is
strategy-proof. Each of the reforms enlarged this set. Simultaneously, following the reforms,
the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students.
Roughly, the reforms made the mechanism more immune by using one or both of the
following features: they allowed students to submit longer lists of acceptable schools and
made admission to every school less sensitive to its rank in the list. Intuitively, a longer list
allows students to be less strategic about selecting which schools to include in the list, while
lower sensitivity about ranking facilitates truthful ranking of the selected schools.
We illustrate our concept and the result in the following example.
Illustrative Example. Let us consider the two reforms of the Chicago SHS in 2009 and
2010. Each school uses a common priority based on students’ composite scores. The admis-
sion to each of these schools is very competitive. To give you an idea, only 4 000 from more
than 10 000 participants were admitted in the 2018 admission session. In 2009, the Chicago
SHS replaced the Boston mechanism where students can rank only 4 schools (β4) with a
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serial dictatorship with the same ranking constraint (SD4).1 In 2010 the mechanism stayed
the same but the constrained was increased to 6 (SD6).
Among the 10 schools, 5 are elite, being the top 5 schools in the state of Illinois and among
top 100 in the US (see Table 1). These schools are preferred by most, if not all, students
over each other school. For simplicity, let us suppose that students have tier preferences:
each student prefers each top 5 school over each non top 5 school, but may differ on ranking
schools in each tier. Let each school have 400 seats.
Under the mechanism β4, each of the 400-highest priority students is guaranteed a seat
in his most preferred school, while each other student may potentially get each school by a
profitable manipulation. The admission to every school is thus strategy-proof only for the
400-highest priority students via β4.
However, under the mechanism SD4, each of the 1600-highest priority students is guar-
anteed one of his 4 most preferred schools (Lemma 3). The admission to every school is
strategy-proof for each of them, while each other student can potentially get every school
by a profitable manipulation. Under SD6, this is the 2400-highest priority students; while
only the 2000-highest priority students can be admitted to the top 5 schools. Following the
reforms, the immunity of the mechanism increased significantly as the share of students for
whom the admission to the top 5 schools is strategy-proof increased from 4% to 24% in 2009
and further to 100% in 2010. End of the example.
Our results rationalize all the reforms in the light of each of the cited concerns. The reforms
decreased each student’s incentives to manipulate as measured by the range of schools he or
she could get by manipulation. Intuitively, this range decreases due to the more competitive
schools as it was in the Chicago example, which makes the incentives to manipulate even
weaker. At the same time, the remaining manipulations harmed the truthful students less
as the admission to each school became more strategy-proof. Again, in the Chicago example
all high-scoring kids were safe to submit their preferences truthfully.
But the reforms could also be rationalized by that the instances without manipulations be-
came more frequent. The state-of-the-art notion ismanipulability due to Pathak and So¨nmez
(2013): mechanism A is less manipulable than mechanism B if A is manipulable by at least
one student in a subset of preference profiles where B is manipulable.
We found that this notion has limited applications for important reforms. First, contrary
to what was claimed, it only partially explains a major reform in England and Wales that
was followed by more than 50 local cities (see section 4 and Table 2).
1The serial dictatorship is a mechanism where students follow the common priority order and choose
their most preferred schools among those that remain. The definitions of the mechanisms are given in
the next section. Constrained matching mechanisms were first studied in Haeringer and Klijn (2009) and
Calsamiglia et al. (2010).
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Second, under realistic assumption on students preferences, the notion is not satisfactory
for rationalizing the 2009 reform of the Chicago SHS. Indeed, for each preference profile, it
suffices that one student has a profitable manipulation to declare the profile as manipulable.
However, with tier preference structure in the Chicago SHS — strong competition for the
elite schools — at least one such student always exists. By truthfully ranking the top 5
schools the mechanisms that allow students to submit at most 5 schools will leave the seats
at the other schools unassigned. Therefore, many students will be unmatched and at least
one student will have a profitable manipulation. Before and after the 2009 reform, both
mechanisms are manipulable at any tier preference profile. More generally, we show that
constrained SD is not manipulable if and only if the constraint is not binding (Proposition
2). However, immunity to strategic admissions changed significantly after both the 2009
and 2010 reform, and the fact that admission to the elite schools is now strategy-proof may
rationalize why SD6 has been used in Chicago ever since.
Very recently Decerf and Van der Linden (2018) used another frequency notion stemming
from Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016): they compare mechanisms by inclusions of vulnerable
individual preference relations, i.e., the preference relations for which truth is not always a
dominant strategy. This notion explains reforms where the constrained list of the Boston
mechanism were replaced by a constrained list of Gale-Shapley mechanism and where the
list in Gale-Shapley were extended. The major difference with our notion is that we quan-
titatively measure what students can get or cannot get by manipulation. We particularly
measure how schools are protected from strategic admissions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the main definitions.
Section 3 presents the main results for immunity to strategic admissions and section 4 com-
pares them to the results for manipulability. Section 5 develops an equilibrium refinement
of immunity to strategic admissions. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The school choice model originated in Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003); constrained school choice was first studied in Haeringer and Klijn (2009).
There is a finite set I of students with a generic element i and a finite set S of schools
with a generic element s. Each student i has a strict preference relation Pi over S ∪ {∅}
(where ∅ stands for being unmatched).2 Each school s has a strict priority order ≻s over
the set I of students and a capacity qs (a natural number indicating the number of seats
available at school s). For each student i, let Ri denote the “at least as good as” relation
2A strict preference relation is a complete, transitive and asymmetric binary relation.
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associated with Pi.
3 The list P = (Pi)i∈I is a preference profile, ≻= (≻s)s∈S is a priority
profile and q = (qs)s∈S is a capacity vector. We often write a preference profile P = (Pi, P−i)
to emphasize the preference relation of student i.4 The tuple (I, S, P,≻, q) is a school choice
problem. We assume that there are more students than schools and at least two schools
to reflect real-life school choice context.5 We fix the set of students and the set of schools
throughout the paper. For short, we call the pair (≻, q) a school choice environment and
the triple (P,≻, q) a school choice problem.6 School s is acceptable to student i if s Pi ∅.
Otherwise, it is unacceptable. We will often specify a preference relation and a priority order
as follows
Pi ≻s
s i
s′ j
∅ k
to indicate that student i prefers school s to school s′ and finds no other school acceptable;
and, when there are three students, that student i has the highest priority at school s,
student j next and student k last.
A matching µ is a function µ : I → S ∪ {∅} such that no school is assigned more students
than its capacity.7 Let (P,≻, q) be a problem. A matching µ is individually rational
under P if for each student i, µ(i) Ri ∅. Student i has justified envy over student j in the
matching µ if he prefers the school assigned to student j to his assignment and has higher
priority than j at that school.8 A matching µ is non-wasteful if no student prefers a school
that has an empty seat.9 A matching is stable if
• it is individually rational,
• no student has a justified envy over another, and
• it is non-wasteful.
A mechanism ϕ is a function that maps school choice problems (P,≻, q) to matchings. Let
ϕi(P,≻, q) denote the outcome for student i. We present real-life mechanisms next.
2.1. Mechanisms. Most real-life mechanisms can be described using the Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance mechanism.
3That is, for each s, s′ ∈ S ∪ {∅}, s Ri s′ if and only s Pi s′ or s = s′.
4More generally, we write a preference profile P = (PI′ , P−I′) to emphasize the components of a subset I
′ of
students.
5That is, |I|> |S|≥ 2.
6We assume that schools are not strategic. In practice, the priorities are determined by law or by students’
performances, and known to students before they submit their preferences.
7That is for each school s, |µ−1(s)|≤ qs.
8That is, for some school s, µ(j) = s, s Pi µ(i) and i ≻s j.
9That is, there is no student i and a school s such that |µ−1(s)|< qs and s Pi µ(i).
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Gale-Shapley. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that for each problem, there is a stable
matching. In addition, there is a student-optimal stable matching, that each student finds
at least as good as any other stable matching.10 For each problem (P,≻, q), let GS(P,≻, q)
denote the student-optimal stable matching.
Serial Dictatorship. In environments where schools have the same priority order, we abuse
language and call the Gale-Shapley mechanism, serial dictatorship.11 Let SD(P,≻, q) denote
the matching assigned by this mechanism to the problem (P,≻, q) where schools have the
same priority under ≻.
First-Preference-First. The set of schools are partitioned into equal preference schools
and first-preference-first schools. For each problem (P,≻, q), the mechanism assigns the
matching GS(P,≻′, q) where the priority profile ≻′ is obtained as follows:
1. for each equal preference school s, ≻′s=≻s and
2. for each first-preference-first school s, ≻′s is an adjustment of ≻s with respect to P :
• students who rank school s at a given position have higher priority under ≻′s than
students who rank it lower than this position, and
• students who ranked school s at the same position are ordered according to ≻s.
Let FPF (P,≻, q) denote the matching assigned by this mechanism to (P,≻, q). Briefly,
the original priority of each equal preference school remains unchanged, while the original
priority of each first-preference-first school is adjusted by favoring higher ranks.
Boston. The Boston mechanism is a first-preference-first mechanism where every school is a
first-preference-first school. Let β(P,≻, q) denote the matching assigned to (P,≻, q).
Constrained versions. In practice, students are allowed to report a limited number of schools.
This means that schools that are listed below a certain position are not considered. For each
student i, each preference relation Pi and each natural number k ≤ |S|, let P
k
i denote the
truncation of Pi after the k’th acceptable choice (if any). That is, every school ranked below
the k’th position under Pi is unacceptable under P
k
i ; otherwise, the ranking is as in Pi. Let
P k = (P ki )i∈I . The k-constrained version ϕ
k of the mechanism ϕ is the mechanism that
assigns to each problem (P,≻, q) the matching ϕ(P k,≻, q).
Chinese parallel. This mechanism is determined by a parameter e ≥ 1 (a natural number).
For each problem (P,≻, q), the outcome is a sequential application of constrained GS. In
the first round, students are matched according to GSe. The matching is final for matched
students, while unmatched students proceed to the next round. In the next round, each
school reduces its capacity by the number of students assigned to it the last round and the
10Gale and Shapley (1962) described an algorithm for finding this matching.
11According to our definition, a mechanism has as a domain the set of all problems — including problems
where schools have different priorities.
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unmatched students are matched according to GS2e, and so on. Let Ch(e)(P,≻, q) denote
the matching assigned by the mechanism to (P,≻, q).12
3. Results
We first introduce our immunity notion. We would like to test how immune is a mechanism
to strategic admissions, focusing on individual students. We build a definition from the
following question. When can we say that an admission to school s by student i is not due
to strategic manipulation? Obviously, when no profitable manipulation by i gives him an
admission at s, then none of this admissions is due to strategy.
Definition 1. Let ϕ be a mechanism and (≻, q) an environment.
• The admission to school s is strategy-proof to student i via mechanism ϕ
if there is no preference profile P and a profitable manipulation P ′i that gives him s:
s = ϕi(P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi ϕi(P,≻, q).
• Mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof to student i if the admission to every school is
strategy-proof to student i via ϕ.
We qualify these admissions as non-strategic and the rest as strategic. A closer definition
in the literature is strategy-proofness saying that mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if for each
environment (≻, q) and each student i, there is no preference profile P and P ′i such that
ϕi(P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi ϕi(P,≻, q).
If a mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof, then for each environment, the admission to every school
is strategy-proof to every student via ϕ. The unconstrained GS, for example, is strategy-
proof (Roth, 1982; Dubins and Freedman, 1981). Next, for each student, we find the set of
schools for which the admission is strategy-proof to him and rank mechanisms as follows.
Definition 2. Mechanism ϕ is more immune to strategic admissions than mechanism
ψ if
• for each environment (≻, q), if the admission to school s is strategy-proof to student
i via ψ, then the admission to school s is also strategy-proof to i via ϕ and,
12This definition of the Chinese parallel mechanisms is given only for the symmetric version where each
round has the same length e. Our results hold also for the asymmetric mechanisms with different lengths of
the rounds. See Chen and Kesten (2017) for details.
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• there is an environment (≻, q) where the admission to some school s is strategy-proof
to some student i via ϕ, but not via ψ.
Observe that the immunity relation is transitive as it is based on set inclusion.
In the following section, we apply this definition to the mechanisms before and after the
reforms. Subsequently, we discuss its explanatory power compared to the state-of-the-art
notion.
3.1. Reforms and immunity to strategic admissions.
In England and Wales. According to the field observation (see Table 2) more than 50 areas
in England and Wales have replaced different constrained versions of FPF with constrained
GS. In the following theorem, we show that they have replaced mechanisms with more
immune alternatives.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there are at least k schools where k > 1 and at least one first-
preference-first school. Then GSk is more immune to strategic admissions than FPF k.
See the appendix for the proof. Kingston upon Thames has replaced a constrained FPF
with a constrained GS but with a longer list. This replacement also resulted in a more
immune mechanism:
Corollary 1. Let k > ℓ and suppose that there are at least ℓ schools. Then GSk is more
immune to strategic admissions than FPF ℓ.
See the appendix for the proof.
In Chicago and Denver. In 2009, the Chicago Selective High Schools moved from a con-
strained Boston to a constrained serial dictatorship. A similar replacement has been ob-
served in Denver and 4 other cities in England. As the Boston mechanism is a special case
of FPF , and SD is a special case of GS, we also explain this replacement.
Corollary 2. Let k ≥ ℓ and suppose that there are at least k schools. Then GSk is more
immune to strategic admissions than βℓ.
In Chicago and Ghana. In 2010, the Chicago Selective High Schools again replaced its con-
strained Serial Dictatorship with a version with longer list. In 2007, the Ghanaian Secondary
Schools undertook a similar change, from a constrained GS to a version with longer list and
extending the list again in 2008. These type of changes have also been observed in Newcastle
and Surrey in England.
Theorem 2. Let k > ℓ and suppose that there are at least k schools. Then GSk is more
immune to strategic admissions than GSℓ.
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See the appendix for the proof. In the following table, we list all reforms in school choice
systems. We also feature those that are comparable a´ la Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) and
those that are not (see section 4 for the results).
In college admission in China. Starting from 2001, most of the Chinese provinces changed
their mechanisms from the Boston mechanism to various other parallel mechanisms. Consider
two Chinese mechanisms: one with parameter e and the other with e > e′. For these two
mechanisms we obtain the following comparison.
Theorem 3. Let e > e′ and suppose that there is at least e schools. Then Ch(e) is more
immune to strategic admissions than Ch(e
′).
See the appendix for the proof.
4. Comparison with Manipulability
In this section, we introduce another notion — manipulability due to Pathak and So¨nmez
(2013), and compare it with our notion of immunity to strategic admissions.
Definition 3. (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). Let ϕ and ψ be two mechanisms. Then mecha-
nism ϕ is less manipulable than mechanism ψ if
• in each environment (≻, q), each preference profile P that is vulnerable under ϕ, i.e.,
there exists some student i and some misreport P ′i such that,
ϕi(P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi ϕi(P,≻, q),
is also vulnerable under ψ and,
• there is an environment where a preference profile is vulnerable under ψ but not under
ϕ.
Broadly, whenever a student has a profitable manipulation at a preference profile P under
ϕ, then some — possibly other — student has a profitable manipulation under ψ, while the
reverse is not true in some environment. It is important to note that a profitable manipulation
of one student is enough to declare a preference profile as vulnerable under a mechanism.
Comparing mechanisms with respect to certain property profile by profile is common in the
literature (a notable example is Kesten (2006)), but it has two important limitations when
applied to our case.
4.1. Limitation in England and Wales. First, we prove that the notion of manipulability
does not explain the reforms in England and Wales. Recall that the education officials have
replaced the constrained First-Preference-First with a constrained Gale-Shapley. Indeed, we
provide a counterexample to Proposition 3 in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013).
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Table 2. School Admissions Reforms (documented in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013))
Allocation system Year From To
Manipulable?
(More or less?)
Immune?
(More or less?)
Boston Public School (K, 6, 9) 2005 Boston GS Less More
Chicago Selective High Schools 2009 Boston4 SD4 Less More
2010 SD4 SD6 Less More
Ghana—Secondary schools 2007 GS3 GS4 Less More
2008 GS4 GS6 Less More
Denver Public Schools 2012 Boston2 GS5 Less More
Seattle Public Schools 1999 Boston GS Less More
2009 GS Boston More Less
England
Bath and North East Somerset 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Bedford and Bedfordshire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Blackburn with Darwen 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Blackpool 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Bolton 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Bradford 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Brighton and Hove 2007 Boston3 GS3 Less More
Calderdale 2006 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Cornwall 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Cumbria 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Darlington 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Derby 2005 FPF4 GS4 Not comparable More
Devon 2006 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Durham 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Ealing 2006 FPF6 GS6 Not comparable More
East Sussex 2007 Boston3 GS3 Less More
Gateshead 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Halton 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Hampshire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Hartlepool 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Isle of Wright 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Kent 2007 Boston3 GS4 Less More
Kingston upon Thames 2007 FPF3 GS4 Not comparable More
Knowsley 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Lancashire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Lincolnshire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Luton 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Manchester 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Merton 2006 FPF6 GS6 Not comparable More
Newcastle 2005 Boston3 GS3 Less More
2010 GS3 GS4 Less More
North Lincolnshire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
North Somerset 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
North Tyneside 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Oldham 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Peterborough 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Plymouth 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Poole 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Portsmouth 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Richmond 2005 FPF6 GS6 Not comparable More
(Continued)
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Table 1. School Admissions Reforms (Continued)
Allocation system Year From To
Manipulable?
(More or less?)
Immune?
(More or less?)
Sefton primary 2007 Boston3 GS3 Less More
Sefton secondary 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Slough 2006 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Somerset 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
South Gloucestershire 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
South Tyneside 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Southhampton 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Stockton 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Stoke-on-Trent 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Suffolk 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Sunderland 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Surrey 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
2010 GS3 GS6 Less More
Sutton 2006 FPF6 GS6 Not comparable More
Swindon 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Tameside 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Telford and Wrekin 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Torbay 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Warrington 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Warwickshire 2007 FPF7 GS7 Not comparable More
Wilgan 2007 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Wales
Wrexham County Borough 2011 FPF3 GS3 Not comparable More
Claim 1 (Proposition 3 — Pathak and So¨nmez (2013)). Suppose that there are at least k
schools where k > 1. Then, GSk is less manipulable than FPF k.
We provide a counterexample to this claim. We specify the relevant part of the priorities
such that the sign
... after student i indicates that the part below i is arbitrary and omitted.
Example 1. Counterexample.
Suppose that there are seven students and seven schools. Each school has one seat: qs = 1
for each school s. Let P and ≻ be as specified below.
IMMUNITY TO STRATEGIC ADMISSIONS 13
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 ≻s1 ≻s2 ≻s3 ≻s4 ≻s5 ≻s6 ≻s7 ≻
′
s5
s1 s1 s2 s3 s5 s4 s6 2 3 4 7 6 6 5 5
s2 ∅ ∅ ∅ s7 s5 s4
...
...
... 1 5 7
... 6
s3 ∅ s6 ∅ 6
...
...
...
s4 ∅
...
∅
Suppose that school s5 is the only first-preference-first school. Then the matching is as
follows:
FPF 3(P,≻, q) = GS3(P,≻, q) =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∅ s1 s2 s3 s5 s4 s6
)
.
Every student except student 1 received his most preferred school. Therefore only student
1 could potentially manipulate each of FPF 3 and GS3. Let P s41 denote student 1’s preference
relation where school s4 is the only acceptable school. Then
GS3(P s41 , P−1,≻, q) =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
s4 s1 s2 s3 s7 s5 s6
)
.
By reporting the preference relation P s41 to GS
3, student 1 obtained an acceptable school s4
but is unmatched when he reports his true preference relation P1. Therefore the profile P is
vulnerable under GS3. However, because school s5 is a first-preference-first school and that
student 5 has ranked it higher than student 6, we have (where ≻s5 is replaced by ≻
′
s5
)
FPF 3(P s41 , P−1,≻, q) =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
∅ s1 s2 s3 s5 s6 s4
)
.
By reporting P s41 to FPF
3 student 1 is unmatched, the same as when he reports his true
preferences. It can be verified that it is enough to check for manipulations by ranking schools
first. In addition, student 1 cannot misrepresent his preferences to obtain a seat at school
s1, s2 and s3. Therefore the profile P is not vulnerable under FPF
3.
The intuition is that when student 1 claims school s4 he causes the rejection of student
6. Then student 6 claims school s5. Under GS
3 student 5 is rejected from school s5 and he
applies to school s7, ending the process. However under FPF
3, school s5 is a first-preference-
first school which student 5 has ranked first. This time it is student 6 who is rejected from
school s5. Then he claims school s6 and causes the rejection of student 7. Ultimately, student
7 claims school s4 and takes it back from student 1. End of the example.
Nevertheless, when each school is a first-preference-first school then the comparison —
between the constrained Boston and the constrained Gale-Shapley — is valid.
Proposition 1. (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2011) Suppose that there are at least k schools where
k > 1. Then GSk is less manipulable than βk.
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4.2. Limitation in Chicago. The other limitation of manipulability is that it is insensi-
tive when applied to constrained versions of strategy-proof mechanisms: it only bites for
those profiles where the constraint becomes not binding. Indeed, if at a particular profile
a constrained mechanism is not manipulable, then at this profile it must be very close to
its unconstrained version. We formalize this intuition for the serial dictatorship mechanism
used in Chicago.
Proposition 2. A preference profile P is not vulnerable under SDk if, and only if SDk(P ) =
SD(P ).
Proof. The if part is straightforward: if SDk(P ) = SD(P ), i.e. if the constraint is not
binding, then at SDk(P ) each student receives the best available school among remaining
ones and cannot profitably misreport his preferences.
We prove the only if part by contraposition. Suppose that SDk(P ) 6= SD(P ) and consider
the highest priority student i for whom SDki (P ) 6= s = SDi(P ). Each student with higher
priority than i received under SDk(P ) the same school as under SD(P ), therefore under
SDk(P ) student i had the same choice set of remaining schools as under SD(P ). The only
way i missed school s under SDk(P ) is if the constraint k was binding for him: each of his
top k schools were already assigned, and school s was not listed. However, school s still had
available seats, and i could profitably manipulate SDk at P by listing school s as one of his
top k schools. 
For k = 1 this result also applies to Boston (constrained and unconstrained) with a
common priority: at a given preference profile P , Boston is not manipulable if and only if
its outcome coincides with the outcome of the unconstrained serial dictatorship at P .
For realistic profiles, however, the constraint is almost guaranteed to be binding at least
for one student, and thus the constrained mechanism remains manipulable at this profile.
This occurs, for instance, when the preferences of students are correlated, as often is the
case. Next we generalize the Chicago example presented in the introduction. We show that
when students have tier preferences, constrained versions of serial dictatorship are always
manipulable. In general, the more tiers there are, the more binding the constraint will be.
Example 2. Serial dictatorship and tier preferences.
Consider a school choice problem with n students andm schools, each two schools s, s′ ∈ S
having the same capacity qs = qs′ and a common priority ranking ≻s=≻s′.
Assume that students have tier preferences: the set of schools S is partitioned into t > 1
sets S1, S2, ..., St and each student i ∈ I prefers each school in Sj from a higher tier j < t
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over each school in Sj+1 from a lower tier.
13 Assume also that each student finds each school
acceptable and that there is shortage of seats, n > q ×m.
It is straightforward to show that whenever the number of schools in the upper tiers is
at least as large as the constraint, |S| − |St| ≥ k, the constrained serial dictatorship SD
k is
always manipulable. Otherwise, if every student reports truthfully, then some students are
unmatched while acceptable schools in the last tier St are unassigned. By Proposition 2 this is
necessary and sufficient for manipulability of SDk. This is why for correlated preferences the
manipulability criterion is not sensitive and the constrained serial dictatorship mechanism
is as manipulable as the Boston mechanism.
In contrast, our notion remains sensitive in this domain: as the constraint changes, the
immunity to strategic admissions changes as well. We formulate this as a proposition.
Proposition 3. Let k ≥ 1 and (≻, q) an environment where schools have a common priority.
Let the capacities of the schools be increasingly ordered q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ q|S| and qˆ =
q1 + . . .+ qk. Then, the mechanism SD
k is strategy-proof for the qˆ-highest priority students.
See the appendix for the proof. Proposition 3 is formulated for the entire domain of
preferences, and it remains true in the domain of tier preferences. Therefore, in the example,
the share of students for whom the admission to each school is strategy-proof is q × k/n.
The schools in the upper tiers are more protected from strategic admissions. By switching
from β4 to SD4 in 2009, and to SD6 in 2010, the strategy-proof admissions to Chicago elite
schools, increased from 4% to 24% and eventually to 100%, respectively.
5. Strategic admissions in equilibrium
In this section, we develop a more refined concept of immunity to strategic admissions.
Previously, we called admission of student i to school s strategic if there exists a profile and
a profitable deviation for i that places i to s. But this deviation did not need to be optimal,
same as the reports of other students did not need to be optimal, and thus not rationalizable.
Now we require the strategies to be mutually optimal.
Let us motivate this with an example.
Example 3. Equilibrium in Boston.
Suppose there are three students i, j and k and three schools s1, s2 and s3 with one seat
each. The preferences and the priorities are as follows.
13Coles et al. (2013) observed that the academic job market has this structure and referred to it as block
correlated preferences.
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Pi Pj Pk ≻s1 ≻s2 ≻s3
s1 s1 s1 j j j
s2 s2 s2 k k k
s3 s3 s3 i i i
∅ ∅ ∅
Let us consider the Boston mechanism. Its outcome for this problem is specified as follows.
β(P,≻, q) =
(
i j k
s3 s1 s2
)
.
Suppose instead that student i reports the preference relation P s2i where he ranks school s2
first. If student j and k report truthfully as in P , we have
β(P s2i , P−i,≻, q) =
(
i j k
s2 s1 s3
)
.
According to the notion developed earlier, the admission to school s2 is not strategy-proof
to student i via the Boston mechanism. However, it is not a best response for student k to
report truthfully Pk, when student i reports P
s2
i . Student i has the lowest priority at every
school. The lack of strategy-proof admissions for student i stems from the fact that other
students report their preferences truthfully without best-responding. End of example.
This example demonstrates that sometimes the admission to some schools is not strategy-
proof to some students only because others are not best responding. This type of admissions
may disappear when we require best responses. To take these best responses into account we
introduce an equilibrium concept. If we fix an environment (≻, q), any mechanism ϕ induces
a normal form game such that the students are the players, the strategies are the preferences
and the outcome function is ϕ(.,≻, q). Then, a strategy profile P ′ is a Nash equilibrium
of the game (I, P, ϕ(.,≻, q)) if for each student i, P ′i is a best response to P
′
−i.
14 When there
is no ambiguity on the environment, we denote the game as (P, ϕ).
Definition 4. Let ϕ be a mechanism and (≻, q) an environment. The admission to school
s is strategy-proof to student i via mechanism ϕ in equilibrium if there is no pref-
erence profile P and a preference relation P ′i such that
(1) (P ′i , P−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (P, ϕ) and
(2) s = ϕi(P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi ϕi(P,≻, q)
Note that when the admission to school s is strategy-proof to student i via ϕ, there is no
preference profile and a deviation that satisfy the condition (2). Therefore the admission
to school s is strategy-proof to student i via ϕ in equilibrium. Clearly, Definition 4 is more
14That is, for each student i, there is no strategy P ′′i such that ϕi(P
′′
i , P
′
−i,≻, q) Pi ϕi(P
′,≻, q).
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stringent than Definition 1. Let us now use this notion to define a ranking criterion analogous
to the one defined in Definition 2.
Definition 5. Mechanism ϕ is strongly more immune to strategic admissions than
mechanism ψ if
• for each environment (≻, q), if the admission to school s is strategy-proof to student i
via ψ in equilibrium, then the admission to school s is also strategy-proof to him via
ϕ in equilibrium and,
• there is an environment (≻, q) where the admission to some school s is strategy-proof
to some student i via ϕ in equilibrium, but not via ψ.
Despite this stringent notion, the main results for constrained Gale-Shapley mechanism
and the First-Preference-First mechanism remain true.
Theorem 4. Let k > ℓ and suppose that there are at least k schools and at least one first-
preference-first school. Then
• GSk is strongly more immune to strategic admissions than GSℓ,
• GSk is strongly more immune to strategic admissions than FPF k.
See the appendix for the proof. In contrast, the prior ranking of the Chinese mechanisms
does not hold anymore.
Proposition 4. There is e > e′ and at least e schools such that the the mechanism Ch(e) is
not strongly less immune to strategic admissions than Ch(e
′).
Proof. We prove by the following example and the mechanisms Ch2 and Ch1 = β.
Suppose that there are 4 students and 4 schools. Let (P ∗,≻, q) be a problem where each
school has one seat and P and ≻ are specified as follows.
P ∗i P
∗
j P
∗
k P
∗
m P
∗
t P
′
i ≻s1 ≻s2 ≻s3 ≻s4
s3 s3 s2 s2 s4 s1 k i j t
s4 s2 s1 s3 ∅ s2 m k
...
...
s1 ∅ ∅ s1 ∅ j
...
s2 ∅ t
∅ i
Then we have
Ch(2)(P ∗,≻, q) =
(
i j k m t
∅ s3 s2 s1 s4
)
.
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Suppose that student i reports the preference relation P ′i . We show that (P
′
i , P
∗
−i) is a Nash
equilibrium of the game (P ∗, Ch(2)). First,
(1) Ch(2)(P ′i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) =
(
i j k m t
s1 s3 s2 ∅ s4
)
.
In the matching in equation 1, every student, other than i and m, is matched to hisr most
preferred school under P ∗. Thus we need to check that it is a best response for student i
and m. School s3 and s4 are assigned to the highest priority students. Therefore, student i
cannot get a seat at each of these schools by reporting a preference relation other than P ′i .
Let us consider now student m. In any strategy where he did not include school s1 among
the top two acceptable schools, the outcome is the matching in equation 1. Suppose that he
uses a strategy P ′m where he includes school s1 among the top two acceptable schools. Then,
Ch(2)(P ′i , P
′
m, P
∗
−{i,m},≻, q) =
(
i j k m t
s2 s3 s1 ∅ s4
)
,
where student m remains unmatched. Therefore, student i and m do not have a profitable
deviation and (P ′i , P
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (P
∗, Ch(2)). Since
s1 = Ch
(2)
i (P
′
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) P
∗
i Ch
(2)
i (P
∗,≻, q),
then the admission to school s1 is not strategy-proof to student i via Ch
(2) in equilibrium.
Next, we show that the admission to school s1 is strategy-proof to student i via Ch
(1) = β
in equilibrium. Suppose that for some preference profile P and P ′i , we have
(2) s1 = Ch
(1)
i (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi Ch
(1)
i (P,≻, q).
We now show that (P ′i , P−i) is not a Nash equilibrium of the game (P, β). This will complete
the proof showing that student i does not have a strategic admission to school s1 via β. The
Boston mechanism produces a Pareto optimal matching with respect to reported preferences.
Therefore equation 2 implies that some student j′ is worse-off under β(P ′i , P−i,≻, q) compared
to β(P,≻, q). We consider two cases depending on what j′ gets:
Case 1: Student j′ is matched to his first choice school under β(P,≻, q), denoted by s.
Then student j′ is the highest priority student among those who ranked school s first. Since
j′ is worse-off, and thus not matched to school s under β(P ′i , P−i,≻, q), then student i has
ranked school s first under P ′i and is matched to it. By equation 2, s = s1 which contradicts
the fact that student j′ has higher priority than student i under ≻s1 .
Case 2: Student j′ is not matched to his first choice school under β(P,≻, q). Let s =
βj′(P,≻, q). Then no student ranked school s first under P . Let P
s
j′ be a preference relation
where he has ranked school s first. We claim that βj′(P
′
i , P
s
j′, P−{i,j′},≻, q) = s. Suppose, to
the contrary, that this is not the case. Then student 1 has ranked school s first under P ′i , and
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is the only student who has ranked it first under (P ′i , P−i). Thus s = βi(P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) = s1.
Since student i has lower priority than student j′ under ≻s1 , βj′(P
′
i , P
s
j′, P−{i,j′},≻, q) = s,
contradicting our assumption that student j′ is not matched to school s.
Therefore student j′ has a profitable deviation from (P ′i , P−i), and (P
′
i , P−i) is not a Nash
equilibrium of the game (P, β). Under (≻, q), the admission to school s is strategy-proof to
student i via Ch(1) in equilibrium. 
6. Conclusion
All strategy-proof mechanisms are alike, each vulnerable mechanism is vulnerable in its
own way. Compared to another, a mechanism can be vulnerable at a larger set of profiles as in
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013), larger set of preference relations as in Decerf and Van der Linden
(2018). A mechanism can also be manipulated by a larger set of agents, giving them stronger
incentives to manipulate and causing worse consequences for others — as measured by the
range of outcomes that these manipulations induce. This is the focus of our paper.
We compare vulnerable mechanisms by what we call immunity: that is how many agents
can manipulate them and to what extent. This notion is first introduced by Bonkoungou
(2019) to study the relation between favoring higher ranks and incentives in school choice.
Here we argued that this metric represents the concerns of the policy-makers and the public
that accompanied recent reforms in admissions systems around the world; and showed that
each of these reforms made the mechanisms more immune. Namely, after each reform, in
each environment (set of students, schools, priorities and capacities), for each student there
are fewer schools that he can access by profitable manipulation, and each school is more
protected from these manipulations.
Immunity also comes in an equilibrium version: when student imanipulates the mechanism
to get to a school at preference profile P , we require P and i’s deviation to form an equilibrium
in the game induced by the mechanism. This concept is arguably less realistic for markets
where best responses is hard to expect, e.g., when the market is large, but it is a standard
refining criterion for smaller problems. Our main results carry over to this equilibrium
version of immunity for each mechanism except for the Chinese (Theorem 4, Proposition 4).
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013)’s seminal paper was one of the first attempts to compare vul-
nerable mechanisms and it has generated a literature on other applications and extensions.
Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016) ranked voting rules by inclusion of the vulnerable preference
relations of each agent i, that is the relations for which there exist preferences of others such
that i can manipulate. This notion was recently used by Decerf and Van der Linden (2018)
to rank constrained Boston and GS mechanisms. Andersson et al. (2014a) ranked budget
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balanced and fair rules by counting, for each preference profile, the number of agents who
have profitable manipulations. They find rules that minimize (by inclusion) the number of
agents and coalitions that can manipulate. In the same problem Andersson et al. (2014b)
find the rule that minimizes the maximal gain that an agent can get by manipulation. Next,
Chen and Kesten (2017) and Dur et al. (2018) used manipulability to compare mechanisms
used in China and Taiwan, respectively.
Another related notion is manipulability ranking criterion due to Chen et al. (2016): com-
pared to mechanism A, they define mechanism B to be more manipulable if for each agent,
at each profile where he can manipulate and get a particular outcome under mechanism A,
he can do the same under mechanism B. This notion is useful for ranking all stable mech-
anisms in an intuitive sense. However, unlike the results in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) and
in the current paper, these results cannot be attained using the equilibrium version of their
manipulability criterion: in equilibrium each stable mechanism is as manipulable as another.
As this notion also relies on the preference by preference and agent by agent comparison, it
does not explain any of the reforms studied here (except the Chicago SHS).
We should note that immunity to manipulation, regardless of the precise metric used to
measure it, is not the final criterion in selecting a mechanism. Perhaps, the ultimate concern
of the policy-makers and the parents is not the vulnerability itself, but rather the complexity
of finding an optimal strategy. This complexity results in drawbacks such as higher number of
mismatches, wastes, justified envy and overall dissatisfaction with the system. Surprisingly,
the mechanism designers around the world are ready to tolerate certain levels of these draw-
backs, but why that ever do it when a strategy-proof mechanism is readily available — for
example, the unconstrained version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
is strategy-proof (Roth, 1982; Dubins and Freedman, 1981) — remains obscure.
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Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1: Suppose that there are at least k schools where k > 1 and at least one first-
preference-first school. Then GSk is more immune to strategic admissions than FPF k.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem by contraposition. Suppose that there are at
least k schools and at least one first-preference-first school (in each environment). Let an
environment (≻, q) be given and suppose that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof
to student i via GSk. There is a preference profile P and a preference relation P ′i such that
(3) s = GSki (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi GS
k
i (P,≻, q).
We also show that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to i via FPF k. We are
going to prove two facts and draw a lemma.
Fact 1: GSki (P,≻, q) = ∅
If GSki (P,≻, q) = s
′ ∈ S then school s′ is one of the schools that student i has ranked
among his top k schools under Pi. Since s Pi GS
k
i (P,≻, q), we have s Pi s
′. Thus school s is
one of the schools that student i has ranked among his top k schools under Pi. Then school s
and school s′ are acceptable under P ki . By definition GS
k(P ′i , P−i,≻, q) = GS(P
′k
i , P
k
−i,≻, q)
and GSk(P,≻, q) = GS(P k,≻, q). Therefore
(4) GSi(P
′k
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = s P
k
i s
′ = GSi(P
k,≻, q).
This means, contrary to the fact thatGS is strategy-proof (Roth, 1982; Dubins and Freedman,
1981), that student i manipulates GS at P k. Therefore, GSki (P,≻, q) = ∅.
Fact 2: Student i did not rank school s among the top k schools under Pi.
Otherwise, school s is acceptable under P ki and the fact that GSi(P
k,≻, q) = ∅, by Fact
1, we would have
GSi(P
′k
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = s P
k
i ∅ = GSi(P
k,≻, q),
also contradicting the fact that GS is strategy-proof. Because GSk is individually rational,
equation 3 implies that school s is acceptable to student i under Pi. Now because school s is
acceptable under Pi but not under P
k
i , student i has ranked more than k schools acceptable
under P . Let us state these results in a lemma that we use later.
Lemma 1. Let us suppose that for some preference profile P , a student i and P ′i , we have
s = GSki (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi GS
k
i (P,≻, q).
Then (i) student i has ranked more than k schools acceptable under Pi, and (ii) school s is
acceptable under Pi but not ranked among the top k schools under Pi.
We now prove that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via FPF k.
For each ℓ ≤ k, let sℓ denote the school that student i has ranked at position ℓ under Pi. Let
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µ = GSk(P,≻, q). Because µ is stable under (P k,≻, q) and that for each ℓ ≤ k, sℓ P
k
i µ(i)
due to Fact 1 (that is, µ(i) = ∅) and Lemma 1, for each ℓ ≤ k, we have |µ−1(sℓ)|= qsℓ and
for each student j ∈ µ−1(sℓ), j ≻sℓ i. Construct a preference profile P
∗ as follows:
(5)
P ∗i P
∗
j 6=i
s1 µ(j)
s2 ∅
...
sk
s
∅
Each of the students in µ−1(s1) have higher priority than student i under ≻s1 and have
ranked it first under P ∗. Thus FPF ki (P
∗,≻, q) 6= s1. More generally, for each ℓ ≤ k, each
student in µ−1(sℓ) has higher priority than student i under ≻sℓ and has ranked school sℓ
higher than student i. Therefore FPF k(P ∗,≻, q) = µ where student i is unmatched. Let
P si be a preference relation where student i finds only school s acceptable. We claim that
FPF ki (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻) = s. We consider two cases:
Case 1: |µ−1(s)|< qs. In that case, clearly FPF
k
i (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) = s because no more than
qs students finds school s acceptable under (P
s
i , P
∗k
−i ).
Case 2: |µ−1(s)|= qs. In this case, we claim that there is at least one student in µ
−1(s)
who has lower priority than student i under ≻s. Suppose, to the contrary, that each student
in µ−1(s) has higher priority than student i under ≻s.
By definition, GSk(P,≻, q) = GS(P k,≻, q). Then µ is stable under (P k,≻, q). It is
also stable under (P si , P
k
−i,≻, q). This is because, any student other than i does not have
a justified envy and student i’s envy is not justified — every student in µ−1(s) has higher
priority than i under ≻s.
By Roth (1986) the set of students who are matched is the same at all stable matchings.
Since student i is unmatched under µ, we have GSi(P
s
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = ∅. In addition, using
a result by Roth (1982), GSi(P
′k
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = s implies that GSi(P
s
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = s. This
contradicts the conclusion thatGSi(P
s
i , P
k
−i,≻, q) = ∅. Therefore there is at least one student
in µ−1(s) who has lower priority than student i under ≻s.
Thus FPF ki (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) = s. Finally, because FPF
k
i (P
∗,≻, q) = ∅ and school s is
acceptable under P ∗i by construction,
s = FPF ki (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) P
∗
i FPF
k
i (P
∗,≻, q),
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proving that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via FPF k. Finally,
we construct an environment where the admission to some school is strategy-proof to some
student via GSk but not via FPF k.
Let (≻, q) be an environment such that schools have the same priority order and have one
seat each. Since there is at least one first-preference-first school, let school s be one such
a school. Let student i be the student who is ranked first, j second and m third, in the
common priroity. Since k ≥ 2, the admission to school s is strategy-proof to student j via
GSk. Let us now show that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student j via
FPF k. This follows from Lemma 1 and because he is always matched to one of his top two
schools when he ranks at least two schools acceptable. Let P be a preference profile such
that the components for i, j and m are specified as below.
Pi Pj Pm
s′ s′ s
s s s′
∅ ∅ ∅
Then FPF kj (P,≻, q) = ∅ because school s is a first-preference-first school for which student
j did not rank as high as student m. Let P si be a preference relation where s is the only
acceptable school for student j. Then FPF kj (P
s
j , P−j,≻, q) = s. Therefore the admission to
school s is not strategy-proof to student j via FPF k. 
Theorem 2: Let k > ℓ and suppose that there are at least k schools. Then GSk is more
immune to strategic admissions than GSℓ.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the theorem by contraposition. Let k > ℓ and suppose that
there is at least k schools. We show that GSk is more immune to strategic admissions than
GSℓ. Fix an environment (≻, q) and suppose that the admission to school s is not strategy-
proof to student i via GSk. Then there is a preference profile P and a preference relation P ′i
such that
s = GSki (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi GS
k
i (P,≻, q).
We show that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via GSℓ.
By Lemma 1, student i has ranked more than k schools acceptable under Pi and school
s is acceptable under Pi but not ranked among the top k schools. For each ℓ
′ ≤ k, let sℓ′
denote the school that student i has ranked at position ℓ′ under Pi.
By definition GSk(P,≻, q) = GS(P k,≻, q). Let µ = GS(P k,≻, q). Because µ is stable
under (P k,≻, q) and student i is unmatched under µ by Fact 1, for each ℓ′ ≤ k, sℓ′ P
k
i µ(i)
implies that for each student j ∈ µ−1(sℓ′), j ≻sℓ′ i. Let P
∗ be a preference profile defined as
follows:
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(6)
P ∗i P
∗
j 6=i
s1 µ(j)
s2 ∅
...
sℓ
s
∅
Then GSℓ(P ∗,≻, q) = µ, where student i is unmatched. Let P si be a preference relation
where s is the only acceptable school for student i. If |µ−1(s)|< qs, then GS
ℓ
i (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻
, q) = s. If |µ−1(s)|= qs, then by Case 2 above, student i has higher priority than some
student in µ−1(s). Therefore, GSℓi (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) = s. Therefore the admission to school s is
not strategy-proof to student i via GSℓ.
We provide an environment where the admission to some school is strategy-proof to a
student via GSℓ but not via GSk. Fix an environment (≻, q) where schools have the same
priority and where each has one seat. Then GSℓ is strategy-proof to the top ℓ students under
the common priority but not to the (ℓ+ 1)’s priority student. Since k ≥ ℓ+ 1, then GSk is
strategy-proof to the (ℓ+ 1)’s priority student.

Proof of Corollary 1. Fix an environment (≻, q) and suppose that the admission to school s
is not strategy-proof to student i via GSk. By Theorem 2 the admission to school s is also
not strategy-proof to student i via GSℓ. By Theorem 1 the admission to school s is also not
strategy-proof to student i via FPF ℓ.
It remains to provide an environment where the converse is not true. We provided such
an environment in the proof of Theorem 1: there the admission to some school s is strategy-
proof to student i via GSℓ but not via FPF ℓ. By Theorem 2 the admission to school s is
strategy-proof to student i via GSk. 
Theorem 3: Let e > e′ and suppose that there is at least e schools. Then Ch(e) is more
immune to strategic admissions than Ch(e
′).
Proof of Theorem 3. First, we collect some basic results that are proven in Chen and Kesten
(2017) needed to prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. (Chen and Kesten, 2017). Let e be given. Let P be a preference profile, i a
student, s′ a school and P s
′
i a preference relation where i has ranked school s
′ first.
(i) Suppose that student i is matched to school s′ under Ch(e)(P,≻, q). Then he is also
matched to school s′ under Ch(e)(P s
′
i , P−i,≻, q).
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(ii) Suppose that student i prefers school s′ to his matching under Ch(e)(P,≻, q) and has
ranked it among his top e schools under P . Then he cannot obtain a seat at school
s′ by misrepresenting his preferences.
We prove the theorem by contraposition. Fix an environment (≻, q) and suppose that the
admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via Ch(e). Then there is a preference
profile P and a preference relation P ′i such that
(7) s = Ch
(e)
i (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi Ch
(e)
i (P,≻, q).
Let P si be a preference relation where student i has ranked school s first. By Lemma 2 (i),
Ch
(e)
i (P
s
i , P−i,≻, q) = s. Then student i is matched in the first round of the mechanism.
Thus,
(8) GSi(P
s
i , P
e
−i,≻, q) = s.
Since s Pi Ch
(e)
i (P,≻, q), then student i has been rejected by school s at some round. Hence
all the seats of school s have been assigned under µ = Ch(e)(P,≻, q). That is |µ−1(s)|= qs.
Let N = µ−1(s) denote the set of students who are matched to school s under Ch(e)(P,≻, q).
We now prove that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via Ch(e
′).
By Lemma 2 (ii), student i did not rank school s among his top e schools under P . By
equation 7, if µ(i) is a school, then it is ranked lower that the position e under Pi. We
consider two cases:
Case 1: At least one student inN has lower priority than student i under ≻s. Since e
′ < e,
student i has ranked more than e′ schools above school s under Pi. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , e
′,
let sℓ be the ℓ
′th ranked school under Pi. Let P
∗ denote the following preference profile:
P ∗i P
∗
j 6=i
s1 µ(j)
... ∅
se′
s
µ(i)
∅
Note that student i is not matched in the first round Ch(e). Thus GSi(P
e,≻, q) = ∅.
Then for each ℓ = 1, . . . , e′, each student matched to school sℓ in µ has higher priority than
student i under ≻sℓ .
15 Furthermore, under P ∗, each student in N has ranked school s first
and student i did not rank it among the top e′. Therefore,
15This is because for each ℓ = 1, . . . , e′ and each student j such that µ(j) = sℓ, sℓ = GSj(P
e,≻, q) and
sℓ P
e
i µ(i).
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Ch(e
′)(P,≻, q) = µ.
Since at least one student in N has lower priroity than student i under ≻s we have,
Ch(e
′)(P si , P
∗
−i,≻, q) = s,
proving that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via Ch(e
′).
Case 2: Every student in N has higher priority than student i under ≻s. We claim that
Claim: at least one student in N has ranked school s below position e under P .
Proof of the claim. Suppose, to the contrary, that every student in N has ranked school s
among the top e schools under P . Let η = GS(P e,≻, q). Student i is not matched to his
top e schools under Ch(e)(P,≻, q). Therefore, η(i) = ∅. Every student in N is matched to
school s under µ and has ranked it among the top e schools under P . Then for each j ∈ N ,
η(j) = s. Because every student in N has higher priority than student i under ≻s, η is also
stable under (P si , P
e
−i,≻, q). By Roth (1984) the set of matched students is the same at all
stable matchings. Hence GSi(P
s
i , P
e
−i,≻, q) = ∅. This contracts equation 8. 
Since there is at least one student in N who ranked school s below position e under P and
that e′ < e, there is at least one student in N who ranked school s below position e′ under
P . Let j be one such student. For each ℓ = 1, . . . , e′, let siℓ and s
j
ℓ denote the ℓ
′th ranked
school of student i and j, respectively, under P . Let P ∗ be the following profile.
P ∗i P
∗
j P
∗
k 6=i,j
si1 s
j
1 µ(k)
...
... ∅
sie′ s
j
e′
s s
µ(i) ∅
∅
All seats of each of the schools sj1, . . . , s
j
e′ are assigned in the first round of Ch
(e)(P,≻, q).
Since student i is matched (if any) in a round later than the first round of Ch(e)(P,≻, q),
µ(i) is not one of the schools sj1 . . . , s
j
e′. Let ℓ = 1 . . . , e
′. Because student j has ranked
school sjℓ among the top e schools under P and has been rejected, all its seats have been
assigned at the first round of Ch(e)(P,≻, q) to students who have higher priority than him
under ≻
s
j
ℓ
. Thus each student in µ−1(sjℓ) has higher priority than student j under ≻sj
ℓ
. Then
Ch(e
′)(P ∗,≻, q) is completed in two rounds, and because student j has higher priority than
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student i under ≻s, we have
Ch(e
′)(P ∗,≻, q) = µ.
Now under (P si , P
∗
−i), there is qs students (including student i) who have ranked school s
among the top e′ schools. Therefore Ch
(e′)
i (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) = s and
s = Ch
(e′)
i (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) P
∗
i Ch
(e′)
i (P
∗,≻, q) = µ(i),
proving that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via Ch(e
′).

Proposition 3: Let k ≥ 1 and (≻, q) an environment where schools have a common priority.
Let the capacities of the schools be increasingly ordered q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ q|S| and qˆ =
q1 + . . .+ qk. Then, the mechanism SD
k is strategy-proof for the qˆ-highest priority students.
Proof of Proposition 3. The mechanism SD is strategy-proof. Let P be a preference profile
and suppose that student i is matched under SDk(P,≻, q) or has ranked less than or k
acceptable schools. By Lemma 1, student i cannot manipulate SDk at P . Let i be one of
the qˆ-highest priority students. We show that he never misses one of his k most preferred
schools whenever he ranks at least k acceptable schools. This will complete the proof.
Suppose, to the contrary, that student i ranks at least k acceptable schools and ends up
unmatched under SDk(P,≻, q). Let S ′ denote the set of his k most preferred schools. Then,
at his turn, all the seats of the schools in S ′ have been selected. Then at least q′ =
∑
s∈S′ qs
students have moved before student i. Then student i is not one of the q′-highest priority
students. This contradicts the fact that student i is one of the qˆ-highest priority students
because qˆ ≤ q′.

Theorem 4: Let k > ℓ and suppose that there are at least k schools and at least one
first-preference-first school. Then
• GSk is strongly more immune to strategic admissions than GSℓ,
• GSk is strongly more immune to strategic admissions than FPF k.
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove the theorem by contraposition. Suppose that there are at
least k schools and at least one first-preference-first school. Let an environment (≻, q) be
given and suppose that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via GSk
in equilibrium. There is a preference profile P and a preference relation P ′i such that
• (P ′i , P−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the (P,GS
k) and
• s = GSki (P
′
i , P−i,≻, q) Pi GS
k
i (P,≻, q).
We show that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to student i via FPF k and
GSℓ in equilibrium. The difference with the proof of Theorem 1 and
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we further assumed that (P ′i , P−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the (P,GS
k). For each of the
preference profiles that we constructed in equations 5 and 6, we have
s = GSki (P
s
i , P
∗
−i,≻, q) P
∗
i GS
k
i (P
∗,≻, q),
where student i has ranked school s first under P si . Note that there is a student in µ
−1(s)
who has lower priority than student i under ≻s. Let j be the lowest priority students among
them. Now, under FPF k(P si , P
∗,≻, q) student j is unmatched, student i is matched to
school s and each of the remaining students is matched to their first choice school. The
strategy (P si , P
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium of (P, FPF
k). Indeed, student i cannot get a seat
at a school s′ that he prefers to s because each student in µ−1(s′) has ranked s′ first and
has higher priority than him under ≻s′. Similarly, each student matched to school s under
FPF k(P si , P
∗
−i,≻, q) has higher priority than student j under ≻s and has ranked it first
under (P si , P
∗
−i). Thus student j cannot be matched to school s by reporting a preference
relation other than P ∗j . The prove that the admission to school s is not strategy-proof to
student i via FPF k in equilibrium.
The argument can be used to prove that (P si , P
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium of the game
(P,GSℓ) where P ∗ is the preference profile in equation 6.
We provide an environment where the admission to some school is strategy-proof to some
student via GSk in equilibrium but not via FPF k. Let (≻, q) be an environment where the
schools have a common priority and where each school has one seat. By assumption there
are at least k ≥ 2 schools and students. Let students be ordered from 1, the highest priority
student, to |I|, the lowest priority student. By Proposition 3, GSk = SDk is strategy-proof
for student 2. Without loss of generality, let us assume that school s2 is a first-preference-first
school. Let P be the following preference profile:
P1 P2 P3 P−{1,2,3}
s1 s1 s2 ∅
∅ s2 ∅
∅
Since k ≥ 2, FPF k2 (P,≻, q) = ∅. Let P
s2
2 be a preference relation where student 2 ranks
school s2 first. Clearly, (P
s2
2 , P−2) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (P, FPF
k) and
s2 = FPF
k
2 (P
s2
2 , P−2,≻, q) P2 FPF
k
2 (P,≻, q).
Therefore, the admission to school s2 is not strategy-proof to student 2 via FPF
k in equi-
librium.
We consider the same environment to show that the admission to some school is strategy-
proof to some student via GSk in equilibrium but not via GSℓ. Since k > ℓ, k ≥ ℓ+1 and by
the Proposition 3, GSk = SDk is strategy-proof to the student ℓ+ 1. Let P be a preference
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profile such that for each student i, Pi is specified as follows (recall that there is at least k
schools).
Pi
s1
...
sℓ
sℓ+1
∅
Then GSℓℓ+1(P,≻, q) = ∅. Let P
sℓ+1
ℓ+1 be a preference relation where student ℓ + 1 ranked
school sℓ+1 first. Clearly, (P
sℓ+1
ℓ+1 , P−(ℓ+1)) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (P,GS
ℓ), and
sℓ+1 = GS
ℓ
ℓ+1(P
sℓ
ℓ+1, P−(ℓ+1),≻, q) Pℓ+1 GS
ℓ
ℓ+1(P,≻, q).
Therefore, the admission to school sℓ+1 is not strategy-proof to student student ℓ + 1 via
GSℓ in equilibrium. 
